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Historians following too close on the heels of  events, it is said, risk getting 
kicked in the teeth. Twenty years since the collapse of  the Bretton Woods 
system is sufficient distance, one hopes, to assess the operation of  the post- 
World War 11 exchange rate regime safely. This chapter approaches the history 
and historiography of Bretton Woods from three perspectives. First, I ask how 
the questions posed today about the operation of Bretton Woods differ from 
those asked twenty years ago. Second, I explore how today’s answers to fa- 
miliar questions differ from the answers offered in the past. Third, I examine 
the implications of the Bretton Woods experience for international monetary 
reform. In doing so, I summarize the contributions of the NBER conference 
papers collected in this volume. 
14.1  The Questions 
In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the literature on the Bretton Woods system 
was organized around the “holy trinity” of  adjustment, liquidity, and confi- 
dence.’ As Obstfeld (chap. 4 in this volume) demonstrates, these three prob- 
lems were interconnected. The adjustment problem was whether there existed 
market mechanisms or policy instruments adequate to ensure the maintenance 
of balance-of-payments equilibrium. And, if they existed, the persistence of 
U.S.  balance-of-payments deficits raised the question of  why  such mecha- 
nisms or instruments did not restore external balance. The liquidity problem 
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was  whether the  system  had  the  capacity to  supply  international reserves 
(gold, reserve currencies, and special drawing rights [SDRs]) in amounts ade- 
quate to satisfy governments and central banks. The difficulty of  providing 
adequate liquidity was that rapid balance-of-payments adjustment by  the re- 
serve currency countries limited the growth of foreign exchange reserves. In 
their desperate scramble to obtain reserves, governments might raise interest 
rates and pursue contractionary policies, condemning the world to another 
deflationary spiral like that  of  the  1930s. The confidence problem, closely 
related to that of  liquidity, concerned the sustainability of the reserve struc- 
ture.  Under Bretton Woods, gold reserves were supplemented with  foreign 
exchange (mainly dollars), but, within six years of the restoration of currency 
convertibility in Europe, the official foreign liabilities of the United States had 
come to exceed its monetary gold. If confidence in the dollar ebbed, foreign 
governments might stage a run on U.S. gold reserves, much like a run by 
depositors on a commercial bank, bringing the entire system crashing down. 
Adjustment,  liquidity,  and  confidence remained topics  of  debate at  the 
NBER conference. Yet  the way  these questions were posed differed signifi- 
cantly from formulations twenty years ago. And, with two decades of hind- 
sight, authors and discussants suggested that the holy  trinity needed to be 
supplemented by other, equally important questions. 
14.1.1 
This question can be approached narrowly, from the perspective of the ex- 
change rate system, or more broadly, from the perspective of global economic 
conditions of which exchange market outcomes are one part. Narrowly speak- 
ing, did the Bretton Woods years constitute a singular quarter century of inter- 
national monetary stability, the only precedent for which was the classical 
gold standard of 1880-1913? Or should the Bretton Woods exchange-rate sys- 
tem be characterized as operating for just a short interval, from the restoration 
of convertibility in Europe in 1958 to President Nixon’s decision to close the 
gold window in 1971, or perhaps only until the two-tier gold market was es- 
tablished in 1968? 
More broadly, what  was  the performance of  real  and financial variables 
under Bretton Woods, compared to periods before and since? When drawing 
comparisons, contemporary observers had foremost in their minds the inter- 
war years, relative to which the 1950s and 1960s were decades of stability and 
prosperity. To what extent are their comparisons reinforced or modified by a 
longer time frame that also encompasses the post-Bretton  Woods experience? 
If  it is found that economic performance under Bretton Woods compares 
favorably with other periods, this leads to a pair of related questions. 
14.1.2 
How Good Was the Performance of the Bretton Woods System? 
Was the Stability of the Economic Environment Responsible for 
the Smooth Operation of Bretton Woods? 
After World War 11,  growth was rapid, and, it is argued, major macroeco- 
nomic disturbances were infrequent. This is not to suggest that shocks were 623  Epilogue 
absent between  1945  and  1971. But qualitative accounts suggest that they 
were dwarfed by the oil shocks and inflationary disturbances of the 1970s and 
the disinflationary shocks and fiscal changes of the 1980s. If this view is cor- 
rect, then the singular stability of  the Bretton Woods system was simply a 
fortuitous by-product of an exceptionally placid environment. Thus, it is crit- 
ically important to determine whether economic disturbances-in  particular, 
supply shocks autonomous to the exchange rate system-were  in some sense 
less pervasive under Bretton Woods. 
14.1.3  Was the Smooth Operation of Bretton Woods Responsible for the 
Stability of  the Economic Environment? 
Crediting the stability of the economic environment for the smooth opera- 
tion of Bretton Woods may be putting the cart before the horse. The stability 
of the environment was  an endogenous variable to which the exchange rate 
regime could have contributed. The question then becomes what features of 
Bretton Woods were conducive to economic stability. One hypothesis is that 
Bretton Woods institutions provided rules that disciplined policymakers and 
solved the time-consistency problem with which they are typically faced. An- 
other is that Bretton Woods arrangements discouraged behavior inconsistent 
with international cooperation and stabilized the international system. 
14.1.4  What Was the Role of the IMF in the Operation of the Bretton 
Woods System? 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was a prominent institutional in- 
novation distinguishing the post-World  War I1 exchange rate regime from pre- 
vious international monetary arrangements. It is tempting to hypothesize that 
the IMF contributed to the smooth operation of the Bretton Woods system. An 
adequate statement of this hypothesis requires that one specify the channels 
through  which the Fund  made its  influence felt.  Did the IMF enforce the 
“rules” of  the Bretton Woods game forbidding competitive devaluation and 
unsustainable financial policies? Did the Fund and the conditionality attached 
to its loans provide a commitment mechanism preventing policymakers from 
reneging on promises? Or was its role one of surveillance and of  disseminat- 
ing the information required for the harmonization of economic policies inter- 
nationally? 
14.1.5  What Explains the Maintenance of Capital Controls? 
The architects of Bretton Woods envisaged a system characterized by  lim- 
ited international capital mobility. This was true of American as well as Brit- 
ish negotiators: how else can one understand the American proposal, which 
would otherwise have been rendered infeasible by speculative pressures, that 
major exchange rate changes be approved before the fact by three-quarters of 
the members of the Stabilization Fund?*  The question is why the framers were 
2. For details on the negotiations in conjunction with which these proposals were mooted, see 
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so confident of their ability to enforce restrictions on capital mobility. Did they 
believe that foreign investors, disheartened by losses on foreign bonds in the 
1930s, would not be inclined to circumvent capital controls? Or had the effec- 
tiveness of wartime controls convinced policymakers that financial market re- 
strictions could be enforced in peacetime as well? Did they have any inkling 
of the revolution in financial services technologies and financial market struc- 
tures that would undermine the effectiveness of controls starting in the 1960s? 
14.1.6  What Caused the Breakdown of Bretton Woods? 
There has never existed a consensus on the causes of  the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods. At the NBER conference, at least six distinct explanations 
were advanced: differences between U.S. and foreign monetary policies, dif- 
ferences between U.S.  and foreign fiscal policies, failure of deficit countries 
to devalue, failure of  surplus countries to revalue, a secular decline in the 
international competitive position of the United States, and flaws in the struc- 
ture of the system (notably Triffin’s liquidity dilemma). All these hypotheses 
are familiar from the literature of the 1960s. What differed at the conference 
was the way in which they were formulated. Discussion was systematized by 
the use of  models of collapsing exchange rate regimes developed since the 
demise of  Bretton Woods (see Salant and Henderson  1978; and Krugman 
1979). 
14.1.7  What Are the Lessons for International Monetary Reform? 
Each of the preceding questions has obvious relevance for the architects of 
Europe’s prospective monetary union  and  for policymakers contemplating 
wider international monetary reform. If the stability of exchange rates under 
Bretton Woods contributed to the stability of other real and financial variables, 
can Europe expect to reap similar benefits if in the 1990s it fixes its exchange 
rates once and for all? Should other countries expect to reap the same benefits 
if they negotiate a wider exchange rate stabilization agreement? Which of the 
factors helping sustain the Bretton Woods system-conceivably  including a 
placid economic environment, the credibility of  policymakers’ commitment 
to the system, and the convergence of policies across countries-remains  a 
prerequisite for exchange rate  stability? What flaws in the structure of  the 
Bretton Woods system must be avoided by  the prospective European Mone- 
tary Union (EMU) and by wider plans for international monetary reform? 
14.2  The Answers 
14.2.1  Macroeconomic Performance under Bretton Woods 
According to the conventional wisdom, stable exchange rates encourage 
financial market integration (see, e.g., McKinnon, in press). Once the uncer- 
tainty associated with exchange rate fluctuations is removed, one should see 625  Epilogue 
international financial transactions proliferate, forcing interest rates in differ- 
ent countries to equality and smoothly financing current account imbalances. 
These are among the benefits that should have been reaped from the Bretton 
Woods agreement. 
Marston (chap. 11 in this volume) finds little support for this view. Contrary 
to the conventional wisdom that exchange risk is relatively low in periods of 
stable rates, the exchange risk premium, or, more precisely, its average value 
as measured over relatively long periods, showed little tendency to rise fol- 
lowing the collapse of Bretton Woods. Since the exchange risk premium de- 
pends on the perceived riskiness of  exchange rate changes, not on the fre- 
quency of actual changes, Marston’s results suggest that the perceived risk of 
exchange rate changes was not significantly lower in the 1960s than in suc- 
ceeding decades. This points to a critical distinction commonly glossed over 
by analysts of Bretton Woods: rather than a system of fixed exchange rates, it 
was a system of pegged but adjustable rates whose adjustment was a matter of 
uncertainty. Pegged exchange rates therefore did little to reduce the risk pre- 
mium or to promote financial market integrati~n.~ 
Marston’s analysis of  covered interest differentials points similarly to the 
conclusion that financial market integration was limited under Bretton Woods, 
Covered interest differentials can exist in an environment of high capital mo- 
bility if controls are used to limit capital movements. Marston finds that capi- 
tal controls, as reflected in the covered interest differential, were more perva- 
sive in the 1960s than following the collapse of Bretton Woods. International 
capital mobility was correspondingly reduced. 
These restrictions on international capital movements were one of the dis- 
tinctive features that differentiated the Bretton Woods years from other periods 
of exchange rate stability. Using savings-investment  correlations across coun- 
tries A la Feldstein and Horioka (1980) as a measure of capital mobility, Bay- 
oumi (1990) found that these correlations were much lower, indicating higher 
capital mobility, during the classical gold standard years than since 1965. 
I reran these same savings-investment regressions for the Bretton Woods 
years.4 For the Bretton Woods period as a whole (1946-70),  the coefficient on 
savings is unity.  It remains unchanged when separate regressions are run for 
the preconvertible and convertible Bretton Woods subperiods. This contrasts 
with a point estimate for  1880-1913  of 0.63, indicative of much larger net 
international capital ROWS.~ 
3. Marston also finds, however, that, while the mean of the risk premium was the same during 
and after Bretton Woods, its standard deviation was larger following the system’s collapse. This 
suggests that the post-1973 period may have nonetheless been characterized by a relatively large 
number of short periods when the risk premium was unusually large (although over time these 
periods canceled out one another’s effect on the mean). 
4. Both saving and investment were expressed as ratios of GNP.  Data were drawn from the 
same sources as in Eichengreen (1992). 
5. The standard error is 0.31 (Eichengreen 1991, table  1). Obstfeld (chap. 4 in this volume) 
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It does not appear, then, that the pegged rates of the Bretton Woods period 
were conducive to financial market integration. If  anything, the opposite was 
true, given Bretton Woods’s dependence on capital controls, which were more 
prevalent than under previous fixed-rate systems. As Marston observes, post- 
World  War  I1 capital controls were a potential source of  allocational ineffi- 
ciency. Thus, there was nothing particularly admirable about financial market 
performance under Bretton Woods. 
The story is different when one turns to the behavior of real variables. As 
documented by  Bordo (chap.  1  in this volume), the Bretton Woods period 
exhibited the most rapid GDP growth of any modern exchange rate regime. 
Bordo’s comparisons extend back to the classical gold standard and forward 
to the post-1973 float. He  shows that,  whereas national income in the G7 
countries grew by 4.2 percent per annum during the Bretton Woods period, its 
growth has averaged only 2.2 percent per annum since 1974. 
Other real variables reinforce the picture of favorable macroeconomic per- 
formance during Bretton Woods. Output variability was lowest in the convert- 
ible Bretton Woods period (1959-71).  Real exchange rates were least variable 
during this period. Real interest rates were exceptionally stable. The standard 
deviation of short-term real interest rates was lowest during the Bretton Woods 
convertible period. The standard deviation of long-term real rates was lower 
only during the classical gold standard years. 
As implied by the previous paragraph, there are important differences be- 
tween the periods before and after the restoration of  convertibility in  1958. 
Although the average rate of  output growth was virtually the same, the per- 
formance of  most other real variables was significantly better following the 
restoration of convertibility. Output growth, real exchange rates, and real in- 
terest rates were more stable. These findings point to a pair of further ques- 
tions. Was the restoration of convertibility itself responsible for the very dif- 
ferent performance of  real  variables? Or did  the growing stability of  real 
variables permit European countries to restore convertibility? 
14.2.2  The Stability of the Economic Environment 
The stability of economic growth during the convertible Bretton Woods pe- 
riod is incontestable. The issue is the causality: whether macroeconomic sta- 
bility was responsible for the successes of  Bretton Woods, or the converse. 
The implication of  the evidence cited above, that there was nothing excep- 
tional about financial market performance under Bretton Woods, is that re- 
sponsibility rested ultimately with  the economic environment. The Bretton 
Woods exchange rate system was first and foremost a financial arrangement. 
If  it failed to enhance the performance of financial variables significantly, it 
~~ 
correlations,  especially when cross sections of  long time periods are used. The equality of savings 
and investment on average over long periods may simply conflate successive periods of imbalance 
in opposite directions. Still, the contrast between coefficients of  1.0 and 0.6 would appear to be 
very strong evidence of a qualitative difference. 627  Epilogue 
could hardly have stabilized the real magnitudes on which those financial var- 
iables acted. 
Yet  pegged exchange rates were only one element of  the Bretton Woods 
regime, which also included commitments by governments to liberalize inter- 
national trade, encourage investment, and support the unemployed. High in- 
vestment  stimulated aggregate supply,  trade liberalization fueled aggregate 
demand, and the welfare state bought labor peace. These were the ingredients 
of the golden age of rapid growth following World War II.6  The Bretton Woods 
system could have been a necessary precondition for the successful conclu- 
sion of this bargain, insofar as stable exchange rates promoted the expansion 
of international trade and provided a nominal anchor for wage demands. 
Given the existence of arguments pointing in both directions, determining 
whether the stability of  the economic environment was caused by or followed 
from the smooth operation of Bretton Woods requires a systematic attempt to 
distinguish supply from demand disturbances. Supply shocks can be taken to 
reflect the stability of the underlying economic environment, while demand 
shocks reflect the stabilizing or destabilizing influence of  demand manage- 
ment  policy.’  One  way  to  distinguish  supply  from  demand  disturbances, 
which I utilize here,  is the structural vector autoregression approach devel- 
oped by Blanchard and Quah (1989). But, unlike Blanchard and Quah, who 
examined the time-series behavior of  output and unemployment, I follow 
Bayoumi (1991) by instead considering output and prices, which allows me 
to interpret the results in terms of  the familiar aggregate supply-aggregate 
demand framework (see also Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1991).8 To  distin- 
guish supply from demand disturbances, I impose the identifying restrictions 
that aggregate demand disturbances have only a temporary effect on output 
but a permanent effect on prices while aggregate supply disturbances perma- 
nently affect both prices and o~tput.~ 
6. De Long and Eichengreen (in press) elaborate on these points. 
7. One can think of exceptions to this association of  demand shocks with policy and supply 
shocks with other factors,  e.g.,  changes in tax policy that shift the aggregate supply curve or 
changes in households’ rates of time preference that alter demand. It is straightforward to reinter- 
pret statements in the text accordingly. 
8. Details on the methodology appear below in the appendix. Subsequent work has gone on to 
impose further identifying restrictions, so as to distinguish money demand from other aggregate 
demand disturbances (Galf, in press) and labor supply from other supply disturbances (Shapiro 
and Watson 1988). 
9. It is of course restrictive to assume that disturbances affecting output permanently are “supply 
disturbances” while those affecting output only temporarily are “demand disturbances.” One can 
imagine models other than the standard aggregate supply-aggregate demand framework in which 
demand shocks had permanent effects (namely, the hysteresis model of Blanchard and Summers 
[1986]). Similarly, one can imagine transitory  supply shocks (like an oil-price increase that is 
reversed) that have only temporary effects on output. But a special advantage of  my methodology 
is that the “overidentifying restriction”-that  positive demand shocks raise prices while positive 
supply shocks reduce them-provides  an independent check on the aggregate supply-aggregate 
demand interpretation. In my framework, even if the long-run aggregate supply curve was posi- 
tively inclined rather than vertical, so that an aggregate demand shock would raise output perma- 
nently, it would also raise prices. In fact, shocks that raise output permanently are found to lower 628  Barry Eichengreen 
In this kind  of  time-series analysis, it  is critical to employ estimates of 
economic activity whose cyclical properties are consistent over time. Pre- 
1913 GNP estimates for the United States have been criticized for possessing 
cyclical properties inconsistent with the interwar and postwar figures.l0 The 
U.S. figures are built up from time series on production whose constituents 
vary over time. For Britain, in contrast, materials exist to estimate GNP an- 
nually on both production and expenditure bases.  Thus, Feinstein’s (1972) 
estimates for Britain have not been subjected to the same criticisms as the 
American figures. I therefore carry out the analysis using British data. I utilize 
Feinstein’s compromise estimates of British GNP, which are an average of his 
production- and expenditure-side series. The implicit price deflator-the  ratio 
of nominal to real GNP-is  used to measure prices. 
Results are displayed in figure 14.1  .It They show both supply and demand 
disturbances to have been moderate during the Bretton Woods years. The larg- 
est shocks are clustered during World Wars I and 11, leaving open the possibil- 
ity that the Bretton Woods period was unexceptional for peacetime. This point 
is reinforced when the interwar period, one of large disturbances, is excluded 
from consideration. 
Even after the sample is partitioned in this manner, the second half of the 
Bretton Woods period stands out. While the standard deviation of aggregate 
supply disturbances, shown in table 14.1, is no different during the Bretton 
Woods years (1946-70) than for the period as a whole, there is a strong con- 
trast between the two Bretton Woods subperiods. Supply disturbances appear 
to have been particularly pronounced from the end of  World  War  I1 to the 
restoration of convertibility in Europe in  1958. Thereafter, the opposite was 
true. The standard deviation of supply shocks during the convertible Bretton 
Woods subperiod was less than one-third the magnitude of that for the period 
as a whole and only half as large as during the other period of relative stability, 
the classical gold standard years. This supports Bordo’s partitioning of  the 
Bretton Woods years into preconvertible and convertible subperiods. 
The same is true of  demand shocks. Demand disturbances were larger in 
the immediate aftermath of  World War  I1 than following the restoration of 
convertibility in 1958. Their standard deviation during the years of  Bretton 
Woods convertibility was less than one-third that for the period as a whole and 
only half as large as during the classical gold standard years. 
Insofar as supply shocks can be taken as an indication of the stability of the 
prices, which is consistent with my interpretation that such shocks are primarily of the aggregate 
supply variety. Similarly, shocks that affect output only temporarily affect prices in the same direc- 
tion, consistent with my interpretation of them as of the aggregate demand variety. 
10. On this debate, see Romer (1989) and Balke and Gordon (1989). 
11. As  noted in n. 9 above, the implicit “overidentifying restriction” was satisfied: positive 
supply disturbances were associated with a fall in prices, while positive demand disturbances were 
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Fig. 14.1  Aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks,  1874-1975 
Table 14.1  Standard Deviation of Supply and Demand Disturbances for 
Great Britain, Various Subperiods 
~ 
Period  Supply  Demand 
1874-191 3  ,015  .017 
1946-70  .025  ,015 
1946-58  ,033  ,020 
1959-70  ,008  .008 
Source: See text. 
environment while demand shocks can be taken to indicate the stabilizing or 
destabilizing influence of demand management policy, this evidence suggests 
that both the underlying environment and policy contributed to the stability of 
output growth between 1959 and 1971. Global economic conditions may have 
been  fortuitous for the operation of  a pegged-rate system, but  policy  also 
played a part. 
14.2.3  Contributions of Bretton Woods to Output Stability 
A first channel through which the Bretton Woods system could have stabi- 
lized output was by influencing the formulation of monetary and fiscal poli- 
cies. Table 14.2 reproduces evidence from Bordo (chap. 1 in this volume) on 
money growth rates and supplements it with the growth of  real government 630  Barry Eichengreen 
Table 14.2  Rates of Growth of Money Supply and Real Government Spending 
(% per annum) 
~  ~ 
Money Growth 
U.S.  Canada  Japan  France  Germany  Italy  U.K. 
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Bretton Woods (1946-70) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
0.4  4.6  -.O 
1.4  5.5  5.0 
1.1  .5  6.4 
4.7  9.7  8.5 
6.0  17.3  11.5 
4.0  15.9  7.5 
5.0  18.2  14.7 
3.9  18.5  7.2 
9.4  14.6  8.6 
4.3  2.5  6.6 
11.0  5.7  8.8 
5.5  6.2  3.4 
.6  .6  .3 
2.6  3.2  3.1 
1.3  3.6  .8 
10.1  6.2  4.7 
12.8  13.3  3.2 
6.0  7.8  3.2 
17.6  15.9  1.7 
5.6  10.5  2.9 
10.9  12.4  5.5 
4.7  2.0  2.9 
5.7  13.4  13.5 
4.5  4.9  5.6 
Real Government Spending Growth 
3.2  5.7  10.3  1.5  5.6  4.5  2.5 
9.3  13.4  31.2  5.4  9.3  2.4  .8 
4.6 
2.0 
1.3  .6  10.3  4.8  6.5  6.8  -3.1 
23.8  13.7  14.6  22.2  11.4  47.8  14.2 
3.6 
3.8 
1.1  1.8  7.0  7.6  7.9  8.6  .2 
17.6  13.9  11.2  18.0  13.6  10.6  9.5 631  Epilogue 
Table 14.2  (continued) 
Money Growth 
U.S.  Canada  Japan  France  Germany  Italy  U.K 
Grand mean 
Convergence 

















-2.2  -1.6  2.3  13.3  11.1  8.7-3.9 
23.4  18.2  16.1  25.9  10.2  12.2  10.2 
3.1 
5.9 
4.7  5.7  10.1  3.4  5.8  8.6  4.8 
5.1  4.2  3.1  5.3  15.0  8.6  4.9 
6.1 
1.8 
4.0  5.3  8.7  3.3  2.0  6.5  4.8 
3.0  4.6  4.1  3.0  3.3  5.9  8.8 
4.8 
1.6 
Sources: For money, Bordo (chap. 1 in this volume). For government spending, Mitchell (1975, 1983) 
and the references cited therein. (The GNP deflator used to normalize nominal spending is also from 
Bordo .  ) 
spending.12  For the G7 countries, money growth rates were more stable during 
the years of Bretton Woods convertibility than in any comparable period be- 
fore or since. Their standard deviation was lower than during both the classi- 
cal gold standard years and the period since 1973. When stability is measured 
by the coefficient of  variation (the standard deviation divided by  the mean), 
the years of Bretton Woods convertibility stand out even more dramatically. 
Two conditions must be satisfied before we may conclude that the Bretton 
Woods system was responsible for the stability of  money growth: first, that 
money growth was stable in the center country, the United States, which re- 
tained some monetary autonomy; and, second, that the exchange rate system 
forced other countries to emulate the U.S. example. Table 14.2 confirms that 
U.S.  money  growth was  exceptionally stable during the years  of  Bretton 
Woods convertibility. But even if U.S. policy was stable, Bordo’s results sug- 
gest that Bretton Woods institutions forcing other countries to follow the U.S. 
example cannot account for monetary stability elsewhere. His measures of 
convergence do not indicate exceptionally close harmonization of  monetary 
polices during the Bretton Woods convertible years. The average deviation of 
individual countries’ money growth rates from the subperiod grand mean was 
smaller during the gold standard years and even during the interwar period. 
The variability of that deviation has been smaller since 1974. 
12. Nominal government expenditure is divided by the GDP deflator. 632  Barry Eichengreen 
That other countries were not forced to closely emulate U.S. monetary pol- 
icies and that their inflation rates consequently differed, two facts documented 
in Stockman (chap. 6 in this volume), again point to the prevalence of capital 
controls.  Capital controls reconciled exchange rate  stability with  national 
monetary autonomy. The degree of monetary autonomy, as measured by the 
international inflation differential, should not be exaggerated, however. Infla- 
tion differentials can be observed even when monetary independence is lim- 
ited. Even if  trade and capital controls are absent and market integration is 
complete, one should still not expect to see identical inflation rates across 
countries. Opportunities are limited for international arbitrage in nontraded 
goods, and the relative price of  nontradables tends to be low in low-income 
countries (the Balassa effect). Thus, the relative price of nontradables will rise 
most quickly where productivity growth is fastest. Even if arbitrage equalizes 
the prices of traded goods across countries, one should expect to see the con- 
sumer price index rise most quickly in those countries with rapid productivity 
growth. 
Even if  the Balassa effect exists, it may not have had an economically im- 
portant effect on inflation differentials across Organization for Economic Co- 
operation  and  Development  (OECD) countries during  the  Bretton  Woods 
years. Figure 14.2 arrays Maddison’s (1982) estimates of  labor productivity 
growth between 1950 and 1970 against the rate of CPI inflation.I3  It confirms 
a point made by  Obstfeld (chap. 4 in this volume): that the U.S.-Japan infla- 
tion differential is consistent with Balassa’s story. But it also makes clear that 
the power of  the relation hinges on the inclusion of  Japan. When this one 
observation is omitted from the sample of industrial countries, the productiv- 
ity-inflation correlation  vanishes.  Additional  factors  besides  productivity 
growth, plausibly including capital controls and divergent monetary policies, 
thus must be invoked in order to account for differences in inflation perform- 
ance.  l4 
Turning  from monetary to  fiscal policy,  the  second panel  of  table  14.2 
shows measures of the rate of  growth of real government spending.I5  At 4.7 
percent, the average annual rate of growth of real government spending under 
Bretton Woods was virtually the same as during both the classical gold stan- 
dard years and the post-1973 float. But the variability of  the growth of real 
public spending across countries, as measured in the rows labeled “conver- 
gence,” was higher during Bretton Woods than in either of the other periods. 
13. Labor productivity is measured as output per man-hour, while inflation is measured as the 
ratio of Maddison’s CPI in 1970 to 1950. Note that Balassa formulated his effect in terms of  the 
behavior of  GDP deflators rather  than  consumer  price  indices,  which  include import prices. 
The distinction is irrelevant if the law of one price holds for traded goods. 
14. One way of reinforcing the point is to observe that, if Germany as well as Japan is removed 
from the sample, evidence of the Balassa effect is strengthened. Germany pursued an exception- 
ally restrictive anti-inflationary monetary policy behind the shelter of capital controls, which ex- 
plains why it is an outlier. 
15. Sources of the GDP deflators are described in the appendix in Bordo (chap. 1 in this vol- 
ume), while data on government expenditure are drawn from Mitchell (1975, 1983) and updated 
using the national sources he cites. 633  Epilogue 
+Finland 
+France  Japan +/ 
+ Norway 
Denmark + 
r-  0  2.51 
l. 





/  Netherlands  +'- 
Canada  Switzerland 
Belgium  +Germany 
1  1  , .., 
1  2  3  4  5 
Productivity Growth, 1950-70 
Fig. 14.2  Inflation and productivity growth, 1950-70 
The dispersion of growth rates was greater only during the turbulent interwar 
years. 
Once again, the Bretton Woods experience combines very different per- 
formances before and after  1958. The growth of  government spending was 
slower and less variable after the restoration of  convertibility than before. 
Still,  whether  measured  by  individual country  standard  deviations or  by 
overall  convergence,  the  stability  of  fiscal  policies  was  no  better  under 
the convertible Bretton Woods regime than it has been under the post-1973 
float. 
If policy instruments were not themselves unusually stable, it still could be 
that the framework within which policy was formulated maximized policy's 
stabilizing effects. A simple formulation of this hypothesis runs as follows. 
An expansionary initiative adopted in response to an incipient decline in eco- 
nomic  activity is more  likely to raise output and  employment rather than 
wages and costs when it is not expected to persist.16  If it is expected to persist, 
workers will demand higher wages in anticipation of higher prices. The short- 
run  aggregate supply curve graphed in  price-output space will be  vertical 
since higher prices will not alter real wages or profitability. If, in contrast, the 
expansionary initiative is not expected to persist, workers have less reason to 
16. This, of  course, is the insight behind the Phelps (1967jFriedman (1968) expectations- 
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worry about the inflation-induced erosion of their real incomes, and they will 
not be as insistent in demanding compensation in the form of higher nominal 
wages. The short-run aggregate supply curve graphed in price-output space 
will be positively sloped since higher prices reduce real production costs and 
enhance profitability. Demand  stimulus will  produce  additional output and 
employment rather than higher wages and prices. Policy will retain some ca- 
pacity to stabilize the macroeconomy. 
How  do these points relate to Bretton Woods? America’s stated policy of 
pegging the dollar to gold at $35.00 an ounce and foreign governments’ desire 
to peg their currencies to the dollar at prevailing parities may have been inter- 
preted as commitments to a nominal anchor that reduced the perceived proba- 
bility of persistent inflation, at least toward the start of the convertible Bretton 
Woods  period,  when  the  stability of  declared parties  was  beyond  doubt. 
Agents perceived that countries could not pursue consistently inflationary pol- 
icies given their commitment to the maintenance of  Bretton Woods. Hence, 
one-time policy initiatives affecting the price level were more likely to stabi- 
lize output and employment and less likely to be  neutralized by  offsetting 
changes in wages and costs. 
Two points about this thesis are worth noting. First, it is quite revisionist 
relative to the older literature (Mundell 1963; Fleming 1962), which argued 
that monetary policy is less effective under fixed than floating rates. Accord- 
ing to my thesis, monetary policy can be more effective under fixed rates so 
long as it is formulated in a manner consistent with the maintenance of those 
rates.  The eason is that monetary policy  has different supply-side effects 
depending on  the  regime  within  which  it  is  formulated.  (Recall that  the 
Mundell-Fleming model  takes  output  and  employment as  demand  deter- 
mined.) In contrast, it is consistent with a subsequent literature (e.g., Dorn- 
busch and Krugman 1976) that argued that floating rates steepened the short- 
run Phillips curve trade-off. 
Second, this view is quite consistent with growing complaints in the late 
1960s on the part of monetary policymakers about the capital account offset 
to monetary policy. So long as the nominal anchor was credible, the capital 
account offset was small. Higher prices unaccompanied by higher wages, one 
consequence of  which was  higher output and employment, also stimulated 
money demand. Much of  the additional money was  willingly held; only a 
fraction leaked abroad through the balance of  payments. Once the nominal 
anchor began to drag, output and employment did not increase; hence, the 
demand for money did not rise commensurately, and the monetary injection 
was offset through the capital account. 
Evidence on this issue is provided by Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991), who 
estimate time-series models  for  inflation  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
United States spanning the period  1857-1987.  They find that an AR(1) pro- 
cess for inflation is an adequate univariate representation for both countries. 
The coefficients differ significantly across periods, however. For both coun- 635  Epilogue 
tries, the coefficient on lagged inflation is larger after World War I than before. 
Moreover, there is evidence of a further rise in its magnitude coincident with 
the breakdown of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s. 
Alogoskoufis and Smith then estimate an expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve in  which the change in wage inflation depends on unemployment and 
on the lagged change in prices.”  The coefficient on lagged inflation in  this 
wage-change equation shows the same tendency to rise during World War  I 
and again following the breakdown of Bretton Woods. This supports the no- 
tion,  described  above,  that  monetary  policies  affecting  prices  produced 
smaller increases in wages and larger increases in output and employment 
during the Bretton Woods period, when inflation was not expected to persist, 
than subsequently. 
Table 14.3 replicates Alogoskoufis and Smith’s U.S. and U.K.  inflation re- 
gressions, but for subperiods more precisely distinguishing the Bretton Woods 
years. It reports comparable regressions for two additional countries: France 
and Japan.’* For each of  the countries considered, the coefficient on lagged 
inflation is larger after World War I than before. More important for present 
purposes, for each of the four countries the coefficient on lagged inflation is 
larger after the Bretton Woods period than during it. 
Recursive regression estimates similar to those of Alogoskoufis and Smith 
for the period starting in 1948 show a tendency for the coefficient on inflation 
persistence to rise between 1970 and 1973, the time of Bretton Woods’s break- 
down. These estimates are derived by first running the regression with a min- 
imum of degrees of freedom and then adding the observation for each subse- 
quent year.  For Britain  and the United  States,  the tendency for the point 
estimate to rise when post-1971 data is added is evident whatever year in the 
second half of the 1940s the sample starts.Ig (Plots of the point estimates are 
displayed in figs. 14.3 and 14.4.) For France, a post-1971 rise in the coeffi- 
cient estimate is apparent only if one excludes the immediate post-World  War 
I1 years, a period characterized by unusual inflation persistence. For Japan, in 
contrast to table 14.3, the recursive regression estimates show little evidence 
of increasing inflation persistence (see figs. 14.5 and 14.6).20 
17. Consumer or retail price indices are used. Wages and prices are lagged before differencing, 
while both current unemployment (differenced) and lagged unemployment (in levels) are included 
as regressors. 
18. Price data for the United States and the United Kingdom are from the sources used by 
Alogoskoufis and Smith, while consumer price indices for other countries  are from Maddison 
(1982).  Efforts to estimate such an equation for Germany are hindered by a break in the price 
index in 1923-24.  The results in table 14.3 differ from those of Alogoskoufis and Smith by  the 
time periods chosen. Their definition of the Bretton Woods period extends from 1948 to 1967, not 
from 1946 to 1970 as here and in Bordo’s chapter. Similarly, they do not distinguish the precon- 
vertible and convertible Bretton Woods subperiods. Their data set ends in  1987, mine in 1989. 
19. The results are consistent with the earlier analyses of Klein (1975) and Barsky (1987). 
20. Interestingly, France and Japan are the two countries for which Obstfeld (chap. 4  in this 
volume) finds little evidence of price stickiness for the Bretton Woods period as a whole. 636  Barry Eichengreen 
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Fig. 14.3  Recursive regression estimate of lagged inflation coefficient, United 
States 
Direct evidence on inflationary expectations would buttress the conclusion 
that inflationary impulses were not expected to persist to the same extent dur- 
ing as after Bretton Woods. Figure 14.7 therefore shows the result of regress- 
ing expected inflation in the United States as measured by the Livingston sur- 
vey  on  a  constant and  on  its own  lagged  value.21  The  figure, displaying 
21. The June surveys for  1946-84  were employed.  For details on the Livingston data, see 
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recursive regression estimates of the coefficient on lagged expectations, shows 
the increasing persistence of inflationary expectations in the 1970s. A Chow 
test for a sample break in 1971 rejects the null of  structural stability at the 95 
percent confidence level. 
I also regressed expected inflation over the coming twelve months on actual 
inflation over the preceding twelve months. The top left-hand panel of figure 
14.8 displays the recursive regression estimates of the lagged inflation coeffi- 
cient. Prior to  1970, there is essentially no tendency for lagged inflation to 
engender inflationary expectations. Subsequently, lagged inflation has a per- 
sistent and growing effect on inflationary expectations. The same is true for 
inflation lagged twenty-four, thirty-six, and forty-eight months, as shown in 
the other panels of  figure 14.8.  In each case, a Chow test rejects the null of 
structural stability across the 1971 break point. 
To reiterate the implications of these findings, there is evidence of  increas- 
ing inflation persistence following the breakdown of  Bretton Woods. From 
survey data it is clear that this persistence was perceived by agents, and from 
Phillips curve estimates it appears that this perception was incorporated into 
wage-setting behavior. Thus, it was easier before 1971 than after for policy- 
makers to use monetary and fiscal policies to manipulate output and employ- 
ment because policies with inflationary consequences were not expected to 
persist and hence their short-run stimulative effects were not neutralized by 
higher wages and costs.22  Stabilization policy was more effective because it 
was formulated within a framework, namely the Bretton Woods system, that 
provided a credible price-level anchor. Once policy began to be formulated in 
a manner incompatible with that framework, the anchor began to drag. The 
Bretton Woods system was not the only casualty: other victims were the effec- 
tiveness of stabilization policy and the stability of output, as problems of time 
consistency and credibility reared their heads. 
14.2.4  The Role of the IMF 
As we saw in the previous section, Bretton Woods’s par values and govern- 
ments’ commitment to them could have enhanced the credibility of  policy- 
makers’ dedication to price stability and heightened the effectiveness of their 
actions. This raises the question of why par values were respected, rather than 
being manipulated as they had been in the 1930s. A possible answer is that 
the  establishment of  the  IMF altered the costs and benefits of  alternative 
courses of action. 
One variant of this hypothesis focuses on the time-consistency problem de- 
veloped in a monetary context by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Policymakers 
with  an  incentive  to  repeatedly  fool  the  public  by  running  higher-than- 
anticipated inflation could have been reined in by  an International Monetary 
22. This, of course, is the point of Lucas’s classic American Economic Review article (Lucas 
1973). Recursive Regression Estimates of  Effect of Lagged 
Inflation  on Inflationary Expectations 
Recursive Regression Estimates of Effect of Inflation 
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Fund able to prevent the pursuit of persistently inflationary policies. The Fund 
thus provided a “commitment technology” that solved the time-consistency 
problem. Another variant of the hypothesis focuses not on this game between 
policymakers and the public but on a parallel game between domestic and 
foreign governments. The problem here is that governments might pursue pol- 
icies that work to their national advantage but throw off negative externalities, 
destabilizing the international monetary system. If, for example, the advan- 
tages of maintaining a pegged exchange rate are positively related to the num- 
ber of other countries that do the same, intervention by the Fund to discourage 
unilateral devaluation could have enhanced the stability of the system. 
One can imagine various ways in which the IMF could have enhanced the 
stability of the system or provided a commitment technology. It could have 
been the enforcer of  rules that proscribed beggar-thy-neighbor devaluations 
and macroeconomic policies with unsustainable balance-of-payments conse- 
quences. As  shown by  Giovannini (chap. 2 in this volume) and Ikenberry 
(chap, 3 in this volume), such rules were proposed by  the United States in 
early stages of  the Bretton Woods negotiations. But binding restrictions on 
international economic policies were removed at  the behest of  the United 
Kingdom. An escape clause-that  countries were justified in devaluing uni- 
laterally in  the event of  “fundamental disequilibrium”-was  added  to  the 
agreement. It is impossible therefore to interpret the Fund’s role as enforcer of 
hard-and-fast rules. 
While not the enforcer of formal rules, the Fund could still have influenced 
governments’ choice of  policies by  offering pecuniary incentives. Drawings 
and loans from the Fund could have reduced the effect on living standards of 
domestic adjustments needed to restore balance-of-payments equilibrium, or 
at least allowed governments to stretch out that burden over time. Pecuniary 
incentives could have increased the likelihood that countries would undertake 
the adjustments needed to restore balance-of-payments equilibrium and avoid 
policies tending to destabilize the system and undermine its credibility. 
Dominguez (chap. 7 in this volume) pours cold water on enthusiasts of this 
view. She shows that only five countries were officially denied access to IMF 
resources over its first twenty years of operation.23  Moreover, one can imagine 
the availability of IMF credit had the same effect on government behavior as 
deposit insurance has on a bank-that  is, it could have encouraged risk taking 
by offering a bailout. Evidence presented by  Edwards and Santaella (chap. 8 
in this volume)-that  countries running especially expansionary policies and 
suffering large deteriorations in their balance-of-payments positions tended to 
turn to the IMF for assistance when devaluing-is  consistent with this moral 
hazard view. 
That only a handful of countries were denied access to IMF resources in its 
first two decades of  operation may be too narrow a basis for evaluating the 
23. Much the same pint  is made by Argy (1981). 642  Barry Eichengreen 
sanctions and rewards at the Fund’s disposal. Drawings on the Fund become 
increasingly important, in quantity and number, after 1966. In any case, the 
organization’s leverage may have been largely independent of  its current fi- 
nancial exposure. Reneging on an agreement with the Fund could have had 
costs, even in the absence of current IMF drawings, insofar as the Fund and 
the country were engaged in a repeated game on whose outcome the future 
availability of financial resources hinged. The negotiation of  a Fund agree- 
ment could thereby provide the needed commitment technology. Edwards’s 
evidence that weak governments had a disproportionate tendency to solicit 
IMF support for devaluation-cum-adjustment programs can be interpreted to 
suggest that the Fund’s “seal of  approval” was important for enhancing the 
credibility of governments lacking a reputation for implementing painful ad- 
justment programs. 
Finally, once international bank lending started up in the 1960s, commer- 
cial banks typically required that countries experiencing balance-of-payments 
difficulties reach an agreement with the Fund for a standby loan as a precon- 
dition for rescheduling and renewed lending. For countries in external crisis, 
the Fund had veto power not just over the extension of its own resources but 
over commercial bank lending as well. Thus, the Fund could have exercised 
leverage through its signaling role. It is revealing that, in the nineteenth cen- 
tury, simply going onto the gold standard was the only signal lenders required 
that a country had put its international financial house in order; as soon as 
gold  convertibility  was  restored,  lending  resumed  (Fishlow  1989). After 
World War  11,  lenders required a standby agreement as well as a stable ex- 
change rate, another indication that stated commitments to stabilize rates were 
imperfectly credible. 
Even if the Fund did not directly enforce rules, provide rewards, or impose 
penalties, it could have facilitated the efforts of others to do so. Drawing on 
the theory of strategic games with incomplete information, Dominguez (chap. 
7 in this volume) shows how the threat of retaliation can sustain cooperation. 
The prospect that other nations will retaliate against countries that adopt poli- 
cies jeopardizing the stability of the system may suffice to  prevent those poli- 
cies from being pursued.  The more costly it is to obtain information on a 
government’s policy, however, the more likely it is that it will escape retalia- 
tion when acting noncooperatively. The acquisition and dissemination of  in- 
formation, Dominguez argues, was the most important role of the IMF. Non- 
cooperative  behavior  was  thereby  discouraged  and  systemic  stability 
enhanced. 
There exists no ready measure of  the informational value added of  Fund 
missions and of publications like International Financial Statistics. If we are 
concerned with the leading industrial countries, those with the greatest capac- 
ity to destabilize the international monetary system, then it is hard to imagine 
that, in the absence of  the IMF, the treasuries and central banks of  the G7 643  Epilogue 
countries could not have gathered information on one another’s actions at rel- 
atively low cost. In the Fund’s absence, moreover, the OECD or the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) surely would have developed an analogous 
informational role. 
Even if its surveillance of the G7 countries was of little moment, the Fund 
may have made more of a difference in the case of smaller, developing coun- 
tries. One of the prominent differences between the post-1958 Bretton Woods 
system and the interwar and classical gold standards was the sheer number of 
players in the international monetary arena. The Fund surely facilitated efforts 
to monitor the actions of the smaller players and thereby helped minimize the 
free-rider problems that might otherwise have resulted from the large-numbers 
problem. 
14.2.5  The Role of Capital Controls 
Students of the post-1979 European Monetary System (EMS) typically are 
skeptical that Bretton Woods’s  adjustable peg could have functioned in the 
absence of  capital controls (see Giovannini 1989). In  its early phases, the 
EMS successfully reconciled divergent national policies with exchange rate 
stability by  restricting international capital movements  (see  Giavazzi  and 
Giovannini 1989). Hence, market forces did not require EMS members seek- 
ing to peg their exchange rates to continuously pursue monetary policies con- 
sistent with  interest-rate equalization. Interest rates and  monetary policies 
could differ because capital controls increased the cost of financial arbitrage. 
When international inflation differentials had persisted for a sufficient length 
of time for the competitiveness of  the high-inflation country to be eroded, a 
discrete realignment of exchange rates was required, after which another pe- 
riod of exchange rate stability could ensue. In recent years, Europe’s capital 
controls have essentially been removed. Economic policies have converged, 
and realignments have become infrequent. 
Viewing Bretton Woods through EMS-tinted glasses suggests that it too 
relied on capital controls for reconciling policy autonomy with exchange rate 
stability. The United  Kingdom,  which experienced a  series of  balance-of- 
payments crises, maintained an array of  controls on direct and portfolio in- 
vestment abroad. The U.S.  Interest Equalization Tax  imposed in  1963 was 
clearly intended to reconcile domestic stimulus with an increasingly worri- 
some external position. But surplus as well as deficit countries utilized capital 
controls during the Bretton Woods years, as Giovannini (1989) points out. For 
example, in 1961 and again in 1970, the Bundesbank imposed discriminatory 
measures meant to discourage foreign residents’ purchases of German assets 
in order to limit the deutche mark’s appreciation. 
This is an important difference between Bretton Woods and the pegged-rate 
systems of  the nineteenth century and the  1920s. Contrary to Stockman’s 
(1987) suggestion that capital controls are always more prevalent in periods of 644  Barry Eichengreen 
fixed nominal rates, they were all but absent in the late nineteenth century and 
the second half of the 1920~.~~  The explanation is the very different weight 
attached to domestic policy autonomy. Capital controls were not needed in the 
nineteenth century or the 1920s to reconcile exchange rate stability with pol- 
icy independence since discretionary policy was largely beyond the ken of 
governments. In the 1960s, when the influence of Keynesian theory was at its 
height, the case for capital controls to facilitate intervention was particularly 
compelling. As discretionary policy fell from favor, so did capital controls. 
Hence, Europe has moved away from capital controls designed to reconcile 
exchange rate stability with monetary autonomy, leaving no scope for mone- 
tary independence. 
The EMS analogy also raises the question of  whether the growing inflexi- 
bility of pegged rates in the late Bretton Woods period reflected the declining 
effectiveness of capital controls. As financial market participants discovered 
new ways of circumventing controls, were governments less able to change 
their parities because even contemplating the option risked provoking a spec- 
ulative attack? Evidence presented  by  Marston  (chap.  11 in  this volume), 
summarized in his figure 11.3, lends little support to this view. The Eurodol- 
lar-domestic CD rate differential, one measure of  the effectiveness of  U.S. 
controls, widened rather than narrowing in the final years of Bretton Woods. 
Yet  it is possible that other factors were working to widen the differential even 
while the effectiveness of capital controls was being undermined. (Regulation 
Q restrictions in the United States, e.g., grew increasingly binding as U.S. 
inflation accelerated. Case studies for other countries [e.g., Hewson and Sa- 
kakibara 19771 support the notion that the effectiveness of controls was being 
eroded.) Ultimately, however, this factor must be weighed against other poten- 
tial explanations for the collapse of Bretton Woods. 
14.2.6  The Collapse of Bretton Woods 
Why the pegged-rate system collapsed is among the most contentious and 
confusing debates in the literature on the Bretton Woods system. A first dis- 
tinction helpful for sifting through the alternatives discriminates between ex- 
planations focusing on policy imbalances and those emphasizing instead flaws 
in the structure of the system. A second distinction further subdivides expla- 
nations focusing on policy imbalances into those emphasizing increasingly 
inflationary monetary policy in the United States and those attaching priority 
to fiscal policy. 
The explanations stressing policy imbalances find support in the data, al- 
though the strength of the backing depends on the measure of policy that is 
24. Here I differ from the conclusion of  Giovannini (1989). While there was some use of the 
“gold devices” to temporarily limit the incentive for arbitrage in the gold and foreign exchange 
markets after 1880, I find it hard to classify these measures as “capital controls.” In any case, their 
effects were small compared to the wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates created by 
the capital controls of  the 1960s. As I show elsewhere (Eichengreen 1991), capital controls were 
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preferred.  Figure  1.31 in  Bordo’s  chapter  in  this  volume juxtaposes  the 
growth of  the  monetary base  (domestic credit plus  international reserves) 
against the growth of domestic credit alone, revealing that the U.S. authorities 
were expanding domestic credit at a relatively rapid rate throughout the pe- 
riod. They allowed the monetary base to continue to expand despite the loss 
of  reserves. Moreover, the gap between the growth rates of  the base and of 
domestic credit widened noticeably  in  1968-69  as the collapse of  Bretton 
Woods loomed, a point also emphasized by Genberg and Swoboda (chap. 5 in 
this volume). This evidence favors the explanation for Bretton Woods’s col- 
lapse emphasizing excessively expansionary U.S.  monetary policy. It is no- 
table, however, that the gap between the growth rates of domestic credit and 
the monetary base closed in the final years of Bretton Woods (1970-71),  as if 
U.S. monetary policy finally began to conform to the dictates of the interna- 
tional system. 
Figure 14.9  compares the growth of the monetary base with the growth of 
broader aggregates. Although the rates of growth of  the broader aggregates, 
like the base, rose in the first part of  the 1960s, supporting the notion that 
excessive monetary  growth  fueled  U. S.  balance-of-payments deficits  and 
thereby tended to destabilize the dollar, they show less tendency to rise in the 
three or four years immediately preceding the collapse of Bretton Woods. In 
particular, MI growth displays little trend over the four years preceding the 
suspension of gold convertibility in 1971. Most of the action is concentrated 
in M2 growth, which fell markedly in the wake of the 1967 credit crunch but 
then rose to unprecedented levels as the collapse of Bretton Woods loomed. If 
money growth was responsible for Bretton Woods’s collapse, then it would 
appear that the problem was not merely the excessive expansion of domestic 
credit but  also the  Fed’s  failure to react to the unprecedented  divergence 
between the growth rates of  M2 and the base in the years leading up to the 
crisis. 
Figure 14.10 compares M1 growth in the United States and other G7 coun- 
tries.25  It is less obviously supportive of the monetary hypothesis. There is no 
apparent shift in the relation between U.S.  and foreign money growth rates 
that could have contributed to the breakdown of Bretton Woods. M1 growth 
is consistently slower in the United States than abroad, a fact superficially at 
odds with indictments of U.S. monetary policy as excessively expansionary. 
The explanation lies in the fact that  the United  States was growing more 
slowly than Europe and Japan throughout the period, limiting the growth of 
money demand. Observers warned that the international competitive position 
of  the U.S.  economy was deteriorating, worsening the country’s trade and 
payments position (for examples, see Solomon 1982). The implication was 
that U.S.  money growth had to slow still further relative to foreign money 
growth in order to bring about a decline in American wages and costs suffi- 
25. The figures for the rest of the G7 are  unweighted averages of annual observations for the six 
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cient to reconcile the nation’s competitive position with the maintenance of 
the existing set of dollar exchange rates. 
A related school of thought blames growing U.S. budget deficits for fueling 
excessive demands for imports, thereby leading to the deterioration in Amer- 
ica’s external accounts. Figure 14.1  1 confirms the existence of  a secular de- 
cline in the U.S.  budgetary position in the 1960s. This is particularly evident 
in the shift from surplus to deficit in the high-employment budget balance, 
interrupted only by the exceptional surpluses of  1969. 
While far from overwhelming, the evidence is at least consistent with some 
role for U.S. monetary and fiscal policies in Bretton Woods’s collapse. How 
much weight should be attached to these demand disturbances hinges in part 
on their magnitude. If we use the time-series methodology of section 14.2.2 
above to quantify disturbances, it turns out that they were small compared to 
the demand disturbances typical of the subsequent period. Figure 14.12 shows 
the estimated supply and demand disturbances recovered from a two-variable 
VAR  like that estimated above, but this time using data for the United States 
starting in  1960.26  Although there are positive demand disturbances in the 
mid-1960s and again in  1972-73,  there is little evidence that demand rose 
relative to normal in  1969-71  or that the demand disturbances of  the sur- 
rounding periods were large relative to those of the post-1973 years. 
But, as Garber (chap. 9 in this volume) shows, a central implication of the 
recent literature on balance-of-payments crises is that a small disturbance can 
provoke a large balance-of-payments crisis. Even if  the current increase in 
money supply and the current loss of reserves are small relative to the reserves 
that remain, they may still be just large enough to reduce reserves to a critical 
threshold at which a speculative attack occurs. And other policies, like budget 
deficits that increase the perceived probability that the monetary expansion 
will continue, advance the date of the attack. 
As Garber points out, the timing of  the speculative attack depends on the 
assets and liabilities of the public and private sectors and on the exchange rate 
that is expected to prevail subsequently. The larger the expected depreciation 
of the dollar following the breakdown of  Bretton Woods, the larger the capital 
losses to be suffered by those holding dollars, and the earlier the date at which 
investors would bail out. Hence, as the competitive position of the U.S. econ- 
omy deteriorated and forecasts of  the magnitude of  the dollar depreciation 
required to restore external balance were revised upward, the date of the spec- 
ulative attack was advanced. Similarly, the larger the liquid dollar claims on 
the U.S. monetary authorities, the greater the incentive for each claimant to 
queue up at the gold window before others withdrew the remaining gold re- 
serves. This is why contemporaries viewed the growth of U.S. external liabil- 
ities with alarm. 
26. Data are drawn from the OECD national income accounts. These results and the figure are 
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It enhanced the influence of Robert Triffin’s warning that the Bretton Woods 
system was vulnerable to such an attack that his Gold and  the Dollar Crisis, 
in  which the alarm was  sounded, was published in  1960, the very year in 
which U.S. external liabilities first exceeded U.S. monetary gold reserves. 
Discussion of the problem was renewed in  1963, when U.S. external liabili- 
ties to monetary authorities surpassed U.S. monetary gold. As Garber (chap. 
9 in this volume) observes, however, it is not obvious that these external lia- 
bilities were the relevant measures of the dollar’s v~lnerability.~~  In principle, 
the government’s domestic liabilities could also be mobilized for a speculative 
attack. In 1964, when U.S. external liabilities came to $29 billion, U.S. M1 
was an order of magnitude larger: $409 billion. If only a fraction of that $409 
billion was  sold for foreign currencies, the Fed  and the Treasury would be 
confronted with much larger problems than whether foreigners remained will- 
ing to hold their $29 billion. Contemporary analysts focusing on the U.S. 
government’s external liabilities rather than its internal ones were presumably 
reassured by  the existence of barriers to the conversion of domestically held 
dollars into foreign exchange. Once more, this testifies to their faith in the 
effectiveness of capital controls. 
More restrictive U.S.  policies would have limited the growth of  both do- 
mestic and external claims on the U.S. government. Had the Fed reduced the 
rate of  growth of  American monetary liabilities so that they were slower to 
overwhelm U.S. gold reserves, the effort to peg the dollar price of  gold at 
$35.00 might not have had to be  suspended in  1968. The right to purchase 
gold at that price would not have had to be limited to foreign governments, 
and it would not have been necessary to apply moral suasion to the latter to 
desist. In other words, it might not have been necessary to transform the Bret- 
ton Woods gold-dollar system into a dollar standard. 
Had American policymakers only played by the rules of the game, as the 
French were fond of putting it, Bretton Woods could have soldiered on. This 
understates the extent of  the problem, however, since more restrictive U.S. 
policies would have led to an improvement in the U.S. balance of payments, 
depriving the rest of  the world of international reserves. Assuming, as does 
Garber, that reductions in the price level were not viable, continued economic 
expansion impelled countries to acquire additional reserves. Given the inelas- 
ticity of  global gold supplies and the limited rate at which special drawing 
rights (SDRs) were created, acquiring additional reserves meant acquiring ad- 
ditional dollars. Foreign governments, starved of dollars, in an effort to obtain 
them would have responded to monetary restriction in the United States with 
monetary restriction at home. The rise in prices and money supplies world- 
wide would have slowed relative to the rate of  increase of  global stocks of 
27. Nor is it obvious that U.S. monetary gold was the relevant measure of assets to set against 
these liabilities, for U.S. monetary authorities could always purchase additional gold if they were 
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monetary gold. While the gold problem would have been deferred, at least 
temporarily, offsetting shifts in domestic and foreign monetary policies would 
not have strengthened the dollar exchange rate. There is no reason to think 
that the U.S. balance of payments would have improved significantly or that 
the run on the dollar would have been delayed beyond 1971. 
Ultimately, then, the collapse of Bretton Woods was attributable as much to 
the structure of the system as to the specific policies pursued. Structural flaws 
dictated collapse sooner or later; policies at home and abroad determined only 
the timing of the event. 
14.2.7  Implications for International Monetary Reform 
In October 1991, when the NBER conference on Bretton Woods was held, 
the countries of the European Community were preparing to negotiate a mon- 
etary agreement leading to the establishment of permanently fixed exchange 
rates and, ultimately, a single currency for the participating countries. As is 
evident from the panel discussion that precedes this chapter, there existed at 
the conference considerable-although  by  no means universal-sentiment 
for stabilizing exchange rates over a wider area. What are the implications of 
the Bretton Woods experience for the desirability and structure of  such inter- 
national monetary reforms? 
The most important implication is that simply stabilizing exchange rates is 
not sufficient to automatically deliver the benefits trumpeted by  the propo- 
nents of  such an initiative. The exchange rates of the major industrial coun- 
tries were pegged to one another from the end of World War I1 until 1958 and 
adjusted only very  occasionally, yet  the output,  interest rate,  and  real ex- 
change rate stability that are supposed to be associated with stable nominal 
exchange rates did not follow. Even  subsequently, nominal exchange rates 
were pegged for extended periods without promoting the international finan- 
cial integration that is often thought to follow. There were wide differentials 
in the behavior of these variables across participating countries as well. 
These observations speak to what is known in Europe today as the “conver- 
gence debate.” The question is whether, or, more precisely, to what extent, 
economic policies like budget deficits and economic outcomes like inflation 
must converge before countries enter into an agreement to fix exchange rates 
(for further discussion of this point, see Collins and Giavazzi, chap. 12 in this 
volume). The years of Bretton Woods inconvertibility (1946-58)  confirm the 
feasibility of running a fixed rate system in the absence of convergence; at the 
same time they support those who argue that the maintenance of stable nomi- 
nal rates in the absence of convergence can require capital controls and other 
expedients incompatible with reaping the full benefits of exchange rate stabil- 
ity.  At  odds with this position is the observation that the years of  Bretton 
Woods convertibility (1959-71)  indicate that it might still be possible to reap 
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put stability) in the presence of capital controls and incomplete policy conver- 
gence. 
One reconciliation of these points may lie in the fact that what is critical for 
the smooth operation of  a system of  stable exchange rates is not continual 
policy convergence per se but a commitment to exchange rate stability with 
sufficient credibility to reassure agents that policies will be consistent with 
stable exchange rates over the long term. Monetary and fiscal policies could 
and did diverge in the short run. But market participants were confident that 
industrial countries pegging to the dollar would eventually adjust their poli- 
cies so as to reconcile them with the maintenance of a pegged dollar rate. So 
long  as this remained the case,  international capital movements stabilized 
nominal rates, rather than destabilizing them, until those policy adjustments 
took place. The relative stability of other variables followed. 
Comparisons of Bretton Woods with the current situation also suggest that 
credibility-enhancing mechanisms and the rapid adjustments needed to render 
policies consistent with pegged exchange rates are even more important in 
Europe today and will be still more important to any future international mon- 
etary reform than they were to Bretton Woods. The devices that gave policy- 
makers in the post-World  War I1 period room to maneuver are no longer pres- 
ent. This refers not only to exchange controls but also to adjustments of  the 
rate at which tariff barriers are reduced so as to strengthen the current account 
position of the initiating country or its trading partners. That there is no reason 
to  anticipate another period  of  exceptional stability in the underlying eco- 
nomic environment comparable to the convertible Bretton Woods years rein- 
forces the point. 
This emphasis on credibility is consistent with the argument for a European 
central bank and a single European currency in preference to Europe’s current 
system of pegged exchange rates between distinct currencies. It is argued that 
such institutional reforms are precisely what are needed to enhance the credi- 
bility of stated commitments to exchange rate stability. But even if it is viable 
in Europe, this same model is unlikely to be viable over a wider area. Euro- 
pean monetary unification is part of a larger bargain with political, social, and 
security dimensions. Countries that make concessions on the monetary front 
(Germany?) are presumably compensated when their partners make conces- 
sions on political or social questions. Even if  it is completed on schedule, 
European monetary unification will be the culmination of nearly half a century 
of building the European Community. Although the events of the early 1990s 
caution us to remember how  quickly and discontinuously the international 
environment can change,  a comparably wide-ranging  and  time-consuming 
process will presumably be needed to extend such a monetary agreement to 
North America and Japan. 
Bretton Woods itself drives home the point that ambitious designs for inter- 
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nomic bargain. As several of the papers in this volume remind us, the system 
of pegged but adjustable rates negotiated at the Mt. Washington Hotel was 
part of  an agreement that involved the creation of  an international bank, an 
international trade organization, and, implicitly, a set of international security 
arrangements. Yet,  even at Bretton Woods, certain issues, like who would 
bear the cost of creating a synthetic reserve asset and how that asset would be 
distributed, were too explosive to be successfully negotiated. Consequently, 
in the 1960s, disputes over to whom SDRs should be distributed led them to 
be created first in insufficient numbers and then excessively. The conflict be- 
tween adequate liquidity and U. S. balance-of-payments stability was  there- 
fore allowed to bring the system down. 
If  this premise is correct-that  enduring international monetary reform is 
possible only as part of a larger political bargain and that even the extraordi- 
nary political consensus that united the United States and its allies in the final 
days of World War I1 was inadequate to permit the negotiation of a truly du- 
rable set of  international monetary arrangements-then  one is  left deeply 
skeptical about the viability of a common currency or truly stable exchange 
rates for the entire world. Those like Richard Cooper (1989) who urge poli- 
cymakers to consider a common currency for all the industrial democracies 
are then engaging in long-range planning of the most ambitious sort. 
Appendix 
In this appendix, I describe the VAR decomposition used in the text to identify 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand disturbances. The approach draws on 
Bayoumi (1991). 
The methodological point of departure is the familiar aggregate demand- 
aggregate supply diagram shown in the top panel of figure 14A.  1. The aggre- 
gate demand curve (labeled AD) is downward sloping, reflecting the fact that, 
by raising money balances, lower prices boost demand. The short-run aggre- 
gate supply curve (SRAS) is upward sloping, reflecting the assumption that 
prices are sticky and hence that higher prices imply lower real wages. The 
long-run supply curve (LRAS)  is vertical since real wages adjust to changes in 
prices in the long run. 
The effect of a shock to aggregate demand is shown in figure 14A.  lb. The 
aggregate demand curve shifts from AD to AD', moving the equilibrium from 
E to the new intersection with the short-run curve, D'. This raises both output 
and prices. As the aggregate supply curve becomes more vertical, the econ- 
omy moves gradually from D' to D".  Output returns to its initial level, while 
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shock is a short-term rise in output, followed by a gradual return to its initial 
level, and a permanent rise in prices. 
The effect of  a supply shock is shown in figure 14A.l~.  Assume that the 
long-run level of potential output rises. The short- and long-run supply curves 
move rightward by  the same amount. The short-run effect raises output and 
reduces prices, shifting the equilibrium from E to S'. As  the supply curve 
becomes increasingly vertical, the economy moves from S'  to S",  implying 
further increases in output and reductions in prices. Unlike demand shocks, 
supply shocks change output permanently. Demand and supply also have dif- 
ferent effects on prices; positive demand shocks raise prices, while positive 
supply shocks reduce them. 
This framework is estimated using a procedure proposed by Blanchard and 
Quah (1989) for decomposing permanent and temporary shocks. Consider a 
system where the true model can be represented by an infinite moving average 
representation of  a (vector) of  variables, X,,  and an equal number of shocks, 
E,.  Formally, using the lag operator L, this can be written as 
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(Al) 
where the matrices A, represent the impulse response functions of the shocks 
to the elements of X. 
Specifically, let X,  be made up of  the change in output and the change in 
prices, and let E,  be demand and supply shocks. Then the model becomes 
X, =AO&,  + AI~,-I  + A2~r-2  + A,&,-, . . . 
r=O 
where y,  andp, denote the logarithm of output and prices,  E~,  and E,,  are supply 
and demand shocks, and aIli  represents element ull  in matrix Ai. 
The framework implies that, while supply shocks have permanent effects 
on the level of output, demand shocks only have temporary effects. (Both have 
permanent  effects  on the  level  of  prices.)  Since output  is  written  in  first- 
difference form, the cumulative  effect of  demand  shocks on  the change in 
output (AyJ must be zero. This implies the restriction 
m 
,=O 
The model defined by equations (A2) and (A3) can be estimated using vec- 
tor autoregression.  Each element of X,  can be regressed  on lagged values of 
all the elements of X.  Using B to represent these estimated coefficients, the 
estimating equation becomes 
X,=b,X,_,  + B,X,_,  + . . . +B,X,-,  + e, 
=  [I -  B(L)]  -  le, 
=  [I+B(L) + B(L)2  + . . . ]e, 
=  e,  +  D,e,_  I + D2erP2  +  D3er-,  + . . . , 
where e,  represents the residuals from the equations in the vector autoregres- 
sion. In the case considered, e,  is composed of the residuals of a regression of 
lagged values of Ay, and Ap, on current values of each in turn; these residuals 
are labeled ey,  and ep,, respectively. 
To  convert  (A4) into the  model  defined by  (A2) and  (A3), the residuals 
from the VAR, e,, must be transformed  into demand and supply shocks,  E,. 
Writing e, = CE,, in the two-by-two case considered four restrictions are re- 
quired to define the four elements of  the matrix C. Two are normalizations, 
the convention being that the variance of the shocks E~,  and E,  is equal to unity. 
A third restriction comes from assuming that demand and supply shocks are 
orthogonal. These three restrictions define the matrix C to be any matrix such 
that CC’ = C, where C is the variance-covariance matrix of e,. 
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The final restriction, which allows the matrix C to be uniquely defined, is 
that demand shocks have only temporary effects on output.28  As  noted above, 
this implies equation (A3).29  In terms of the VAR, it implies 
Note that this restriction says nothing about the effect on prices. The aggre- 
gate  demand-aggregate  supply model  implies  that  demand shocks should 
raise prices in both the short and the long run while supply shocks should 
lower prices. Since these responses are not imposed, they can be thought of 
as overidentifying restrictions. 30 
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